Introduction
The SECURID SASL mechanism is a good choice for usage scenarios where a client, acting on behalf of a user, is untrusted, as a one-time passcode will only give the client a single opportunity to act maliciously. This mechanism provides authentication only.
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The SECURID SASL mechanism provides a formal way to integrate the existing SecurID authentication method into SASL-enabled protocols including IMAP [RFC2060] , ACAP [RFC2244] , POP3 [RFC1734] and LDAPv3 [RFC2251] .
Authentication Model
The SECURID SASL mechanism provides two-factor based user authentication as defined below.
There are basically three entities in the authentication mechanism described here: A user, possessing a SecurID token, an application server, to which the user wants to connect, and an authentication server, capable of authenticating the user. Even though the application server in practice may function as a client with respect to the authentication server, relaying authentication credentials etc. as needed, both servers are, unless explicitly mentioned, collectively termed "the server" here. The protocol used between the application server and the authentication server is outside the scope of this memo. The application client, acting on behalf of the user, is termed "the client".
The mechanism is based on the use of a shared secret key, or "seed", and a personal identification number (PIN), which is known both by the user and the authentication server. The secret seed is stored on a token that the user possesses, as well as on the authentication server. Hence the term "two-factor authentication", a user needs not only physical access to the token but also knowledge about the PIN in order to perform an authentication. Given the seed, current time of day, and the PIN, a "PASSCODE(r)" is generated by the user's token and sent to the server.
The SECURID SASL mechanism provides one service:
User authentication where the user provides information to the server, so that the server can authenticate the user.
This mechanism is identified with the SASL key "SECURID".
Authentication Procedure
a) The client generates the credentials using local information (seed, current time and user PIN/password).
The SecurID(r) SASL Mechanism April 2000 b) If the underlying protocol permits, the client sends credentials to the server in an initial response message. Otherwise, the client sends a request to the server to initiate the authentication mechanism, and sends credentials after the server's response (see [RFC2222] section 5.1 for more information regarding the initial response option).
Unless the server requests a new PIN (see below), the contents of the client's initial response SHALL be as follows:
(1) An authorization identity. When this field is empty, it defaults to the authentication identity. This field MAY be used by system administrators or proxy servers to login with a different user identity. This field MUST NOT be longer than 255 octets, SHALL be terminated by a NUL (0) octet, and MUST consist of UTF-8-encoded [RFC2279] printable characters only (US-ASCII [X3.4] is a subset of UTF-8).
(2) An authentication identity. The identity whose passcode will be used. If this field is empty, it is assumed to have been transferred by other means (e.g. if the underlying protocol has support for this, like [RFC2251] ). This field MUST NOT be longer than 255 octets, SHALL be terminated by a NUL (0) octet, and MUST consist of UTF-8-encoded printable characters only.
(3) A passcode. The one-time password that will be used to grant access. This field MUST NOT be shorter than 4 octets, MUST NOT be longer than 32 octets, SHALL be terminated by a NUL (0) octet, and MUST consist of UTF-8-encoded printable characters only. Passcodes usually consist of 4-8 digits.
The ABNF [RFC2234] form of this message is as follows:
credential-pdu = authorization-id authentication-id passcode [pin] authorization-id = 0*255VUTF8 %x00 authentication-id = 0*255VUTF8 %x00 passcode = 4*32VUTF8 %x00
pin ::= 4*32VUTF8 %x00
Regarding the <pin> rule, see d) below.
c) The server verifies these credentials using its own information. If the verification succeeds, the server sends back a response indicating success to the client. After receiving this response, the client is authenticated. Otherwise, the verification either failed or the server needs an additional set of credentials from the client in order to authenticate the user.
d) If the server needs an additional set of credentials, it requests them now. This request has the following format, described in ABNF notation:
server-request = passcode | pin passcode = "passcode" %x00
suggested-pin = 4*32VUTF8 %x00 ; Between 4 and 32 UTF-8 characters
The 'passcode' choice will be sent when the server requests another passcode. The 'pin' choice will be sent when the server requests a new user PIN. The server will either send an empty string or suggest a new user PIN in this message.
e) The client generates a new set of credentials using local information and depending on the server's request and sends them to the server. Authentication now continues as in c) above. The following example shows the use of the SECURID SASL mechanism with IMAP4. The example is only designed to illustrate the protocol interaction but do provide valid encoding examples.
The base64 encoding of the last client response, as well as the "+ " preceding the response, is part of the IMAP4 profile, and not a part of this specification itself.
S: * OK IMAP4 server ready C: A001 CAPABILITY S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4 AUTH=CRAM-MD5 AUTH=SECURID S: A001 OK done C: A002 AUTHENTICATE SECURID S: + C: AG1hZ251cwAxMjM0NTY3OAA= S: A002 OK Welcome, SECURID authenticated user: magnus
LDAPv3
The following examples show the use of the SECURID SASL mechanism with LDAPv3. The examples are only designed to illustrate the protocol interaction, but do provide valid encoding examples. This mechanism only provides protection against passive eavesdropping attacks. It does not provide session privacy, server authentication or protection from active attacks. In particular, man-in-the-middle attacks, were an attacker acts as an application server in order to acquire a valid passcode are possible.
In order to protect against such attacks, the client SHOULD make sure that the server is properly authenticated. When user PINs are transmitted, user authentication SHOULD take place on a serverauthenticated and confidentiality-protected connection.
Server implementations MUST protect against replay attacks, since an attacker could otherwise gain access by replaying a previous, valid request. Clients MUST also protect against replay of PIN-change messages.
The Race Attack
It is possible for an attacker to listen to most of a passcode, guess the remainder, and then race the legitimate user to complete the authentication. As for OTP [RFC2289] , conforming server implementations MUST protect against this race condition. One defense against this attack is outlined below and borrowed from [RFC2289] ; implementations MAY use this approach or MAY select an alternative defense.
One possible defense is to prevent a user from starting multiple simultaneous authentication sessions. This means that once the legitimate user has initiated authentication, an attacker would be blocked until the first authentication process has completed. In this approach, a timeout is necessary to thwart a denial of service attack.
IANA Considerations
By registering the SecurID protocol as a SASL mechanism, implementers will have a well-defined way of adding this authentication mechanism to their product. Here is the registration template for the SECURID SASL mechanism: This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. 
